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This paper uses a two-sector model of a fully-employed open economy, producing traded and non-
traded goods, to examine how temporary and permanent immigration affect the host country.   
The focus is on the implications for welfare, factor rewards, and relative prices of traded goods 
in terms of non-traded goods.  What distinguishes temporary from permanent migrants in the 
present setting is their pattern of consumption, the bundle of productive factors they bring to the 
host country, and the magnitude of remittances they send back to the source country.  Due to 
these differences, admitting a temporary rather than a permanent migrant is shown to reduce the 
scarcity of labour relative to capital, raise the relative price of traded goods in terms of non-traded 
goods, and improve the level of welfare of the native population in the host country.
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1. Introduction
As a result of population ageing, expansion of the dependency ratio and growing shortages in 
various segments of the labour market, the advanced countries are becoming increasingly reliant 
on immigrant labour.  At the same time, immigration has become a very sensitive political issue 
as the capacity to absorb immigrants in many of the advanced countries seems to be approaching 
the limits implicitly set by the voters.  This raises the important policy question of how to meet 
the economy’s shortages in the labour market while keeping the stock and inflow of immigrants at 
relatively modest levels. 
 In addressing this question, the present study examines the choice between temporary and 
permanent migration in the context of a general-equilibrium model of a host country.  The focus 
is  on  several  key  distinctions  between  temporary  and  permanent  immigrants  and  how  these 
differences affect factor and commodity markets and ultimately the level of welfare enjoyed by the 
native population.
 When we refer to migrant workers, we normally think of their activities in the labour market, 
where they help to increase the supply.  What is often neglected is that immigrants also consume 
goods and services, bring capital to the host country, send remittances back to their relatives, bring 
family members, and engage in various other activities that have direct and indirect influence on 
the excess demand for labour.  In this respect, there are major differences between temporary and 
permanent immigrants.  For example, in comparison with permanent migrants, temporary foreign 
workers are less likely to bring their families along to the host country.  For this and other reasons, 
they are also likely to send a larger fraction of their earnings back to the source country in the form 
of remittances.1  Large remittance flows are sometimes seen as having a negative effect on the welfare 
of the host country.  Those who express this view, base their argument on the notion that the natives 
would be better off if the earnings of immigrants were spent locally rather than being sent abroad.2 
 For any given level of earnings in the host country, the consumption patterns of temporary 
and permanent immigrants are also likely to differ.  Temporary migrants can be expected to save 
a larger fraction of their income than permanent immigrants do (see Djajić, 1989).  In optimizing 
their consumption over time, they take into account the expected drop in their income after the 
return to the source country, where the wages are lower. Permanent immigrants expect no such 
drop.  This implies that temporary foreign workers will spend a smaller proportion of their host-
country income when compared with their permanent counterparts, even if both happen to be 
accompanied by family members in the host country.  
 In choosing their optimal consumption bundle, temporary immigrants will also take into account 
international differences in the price levels.  Having the possibility of intertemporally substituting 
inexpensive  source-country  consumption  for  the  more  costly  host-country  consumption,  they 
will again choose to consume in the host country a smaller proportion of their current income 
when compared with permanent immigrants.3 Moreover, the chosen bundle will have a different 
1    For empirical evidence, see Glytsos (1997); Lucas (2005); Bauer, Sinning (2005); Unheim (2007); Sinning (2007); 
Pinger (2007); Dustmann, Mestres (2009).
2    Money leaving the economy is suggested to be harmful on the grounds that it does not contribute to demand for go-
ods and creation of wealth in the host country.  See, for example, NILC (2007), Rubenstein (2004).  Ghosh (2006, pp. 
31–33) examines this issue from the perspective of the host country’s current account.
3    See Djajić (1989) for a theoretical analysis of this issue and Kirdar (2009) for an empirical analysis.On the welfare implications of temporary ... 51
composition.  If relative prices of goods and services differ between the host and source countries, 
temporary migrants will have an incentive to purchase in each economy a larger proportion of the 
commodity which is relatively cheaper.   On the basis of empirical evidence, it can be argued that 
non-traded goods and services are relatively cheaper in the developing countries which are the 
principal source of temporary immigration.  One should therefore expect temporary migrants to 
allocate a relatively smaller fraction of their expenditure in the host country on non-traded goods 
when compared with the spending pattern of permanent immigrants.
 Finally, temporary immigrants usually do not own a significant amounts of capital and, 
if they do, they are not likely to bring it with them to the host country.  On the other hand, 
permanent  immigrants  typically  bring  their  capital  along.    A  number  of  host  countries, 
including USA and Canada, even have special permanent-resident visas reserved for foreigners 
who bring into the economy an amount of capital beyond a certain threshold.  Immigrants 
who  bring  with  them  large  amounts  of  capital  are  believed  to  make  a  significant  positive 
contribution to the welfare of the host country.
 All these differences between temporary and permanent migrants have implications for the 
effects of immigration on the relative commodity prices, production pattern, factor rewards, and 
ultimately the level of welfare enjoyed by the natives.  The present study examines this issue in 
the context of a general-equilibrium model of an economy producing traded and non-traded goods 
with the aid of capital and labour.  The model is therefore very similar to that originally employed 
by Rivera-Batiz (1982), and subsequently by Djajić (1986, 1998), and Quibria (1996) in their study 
of the impact of migration and remittances on the welfare of the source country.  In the present 
version of this model, developed in Section 2 below, the focus is on the host country.  There are tree 
types of agents: native households, permanent immigrant households, and temporary immigrants. 
Each type of household is functionally distinct and its welfare depends on the activities of other 
households as well as the number of each type of household.  Within this structure, the key 
question, addressed in Section 3, is the following: How does the arrival of additional temporary 
and permanent immigrants affect relative factor and commodity prices and the level of welfare of 
various households?  In Section 4, we also examine the welfare implications of remittance flows 
from the host country to the source country.  Finally, Section 5 discusses the main results and 
possible extensions.
2. The host-country model
Consider a host country populated by natives and immigrants.  There are v native households, 
π permanent immigrant households and τ temporary immigrants.  They all interact with each 
other in the economy’s factor and commodity markets.  Two types of goods are produced: Traded 
goods (T), which we take to be the numeraire, and an internationally non-traded good (N), whose 
price is denoted by P.  Both goods are produced with the aid of capital and labour under perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale.  We shall follow the convention of assuming that T is 
capital intensive in relation to N.  The model is static in the sense that it ignores population growth 
and capital accumulation, apart from that associated with the exogenously-given change in the 
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 For simplicity, let us assume that each agent is endowed with one unit of labour.  All labour is 
homogeneous in terms of its productivity and fully employed in a perfectly competitive labour market 
of the host country.  The three types of agents differ, however, in terms of their ownership of capital 
and consumption behavior.  At the same time we simplify the analysis by assuming that all agents have 
homothetic preferences and that, within each group, all households or individuals are identical.  
 With respect to ownership of capital, let us suppose that each of the native households owns 
k
v units, permanent immigrant households own kπ units, while temporary migrants are assumed 
to have no capital in the host country.  They bring only labour.
 Income  of  native  households  is  spent  entirely  in  the  host  country.    With  the  expenditure 
function of each native household denoted by E
v(P, U
v), the budget constraint, setting expenditure 
of all natives equal to their income may be written as 
    vE
v(P, U
v) = v(w + rk
v)  (1)
where U
v is the level of welfare enjoyed by a native household and w and r represent the market 
wage and the rental rate on capital.
 While  natives  spend  all  their  income  in  the  host  country,  immigrants  may  send  some   
of it to relatives in their country of origin. For each of the π permanent immigrant households, 
consumption expenditure in the host country, E
π(P, U
π), is then equal to their income minus the 
flow of remittances, R
π, to relatives back in the source country.  The budget constraint for this 
group is therefore given by 
                      
    πE
π(P, U




π is the level of utility derived from consumption in the host country by the typical 
permanent immigrant household.  Finally, for each of the τ temporary migrants, consumption 
expenditure  in  the  host  country,  E
τ(P,  U
τ),  must  be  equal  to  his/her  income  minus  the  flow   
of remittances, R
τ, back to the dependents in the source country.
   τE
τ(P, U
τ) = τ(w – R
τ)  (3)
where  U
τ  measures  the  level  of  utility  enjoyed  by  a  temporary  migrant  from  consumption  in   
the host country.  Since temporary immigrants usually maintain closer ties to the source country 
than do permanent immigrants (the latter being more likely to bring their family along to the host 
country), we shall assume that  R
τ > R
π.4 
 With the assumptions on the production side of the model outlined above, the maximized value 
of the economy’s product can be simply represented by a standard revenue function Q(P, K, L), where   
K = vk
v+ πk
π and L = v + π + τ represent the economy’s capital and labour endowments, respectively.   
The partial derivative of Q(.) with respect to P, QP(P, vk
v + πk
π, v + π + τ), is the economy’s supply 
of good N.5  
4    On the motives for remitting and the factors that influence the magnitude of remittances, see Stark (1991); Stark, 
Lucas (1988). Docquier and Papoport (2006) provide an excellent survey of the literature.
5    For properties of revenue and expenditure functions, see the classic work of Dixit and Norman (1984).On the welfare implications of temporary ... 53
The market for non-traded goods is in equilibrium when total demand for N is equal to the supply:
       






τ) = QP(P, vk
v+ πk
π, v + π + τ)         (4)
where EP
i(P, U
i) is the compensated per-household demand function for good N of members of 
group i (i = v, π, τ).  By Walras’ Law, when the market for N clears, so does that for T.
By differentiating eqs. (1) – (3), and noting that the reciprocity relationship implies 
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vdU
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where  QPK  and  QPL  represent  the  Rybczynski  effects  of  a  unit  increase  in  capital  and  labour, 
respectively, on the economy’s output of N.  As good N is assumed to be labour intensive, QPK < 0 
and QPL > 0.6 In eqs. (6) – (8), EP
i is what each household of type i contributes to the demand for 
good N and QPKki + QPL is what it contributes to the supply, except for temporary migrants who do 
not have any capital in the host country and hence contribute only QPL units of output to the supply 
of N.  We can then express the net purchases (or implicit trade) of each household in the market 
for good N by Xi, (i = v, π, τ).
   X
v ≡ EP
v – QPKk
v – QPL > 0  (9)
    X
π ≡  EP
π – QPKk
π – QPL > < 0   (10)
                                                       Xτ ≡ EP
τ – QPL < 0  (11)
What can be said about the values of Xi(i= v, π, τ)?  Since N is relatively labour-intensive 
good, the Stolper-Samuelson E
–
heorem implies that (∂w/∂P)(P/w)  >  1. By the reciprocity relationship,   
∂w/∂P = QPL so that QPL > w/P (i.e., the contribution of temporary migrants to the output of N, QPL, is 
greater than their income expressed in terms of good N).  Since they consume both goods and remit 
part of their income to the source country, they necessarily spend less than their entire income on 
good N.  In other words, QPL > w/P > EP
τ.  Accordingly, X
τ < 0 in eq. (11), meaning that temporary 
migrants are implicitly net sellers of N in the host country.
 For the non-traded goods market to clear when temporary immigrants are net sellers of N, at 
least one of the remaining two groups is a net buyer.  If there is in fact only one, it must be the 
natives. They have identical preferences over the two goods, but a higher income than permanent 
immigrants do (because k
π < k
v).  They also spend all of their income in the host country, while 
permanent immigrants send part of their income in the form of remittances to the source country.   
It immediately follows that EP
v > EP
π.  Recalling that QPK < 0 , and  k
v > k
π it immediately follows 
from a comparison of (9) and (10) that X
v > X
π.  This allows us to conclude that the sign of X
v is 
positive, as stated in eq. (9).  
6      For those not familiar with the Rybczynski theorem, the reciprocity relationship or the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
(referred to before), a standard trade-theory textbook, such as Dixit and Norman (1984) provides the details.S. Djajić 54
 Whether X
π in eq. (10) is positive or negative depends on the values of the model’s parameters.   
X
π  is  likely  to  be  positive  when  R
π  and  the  difference  between  k
π  and k
v  are  both  small,  while   
the ratio of τ to π and the value of R
τ are relatively large.  Permanent migrants are then functionally 
“similar” to the natives in the sense that they are net buyers of N in their implicit trade with other 
agents  in  the  economy.  By  contrast,  when  R
π  and  R
τ  have  similar  values,  while  τ/π  and  k
π  are 
relatively small, we have X
π < 0.  In that case we refer to permanent immigrants as being functionally 
“similar” to temporary immigrants.  Note, however, that even if X
π < 0, it must be the case that   
X
τ < X
π.  This is because QPK < 0 in eq. (10) and EP
τ < EP 
π, as has been argued in the Introduction.  
Suming up, 0 > X
τ < X
π < X
v > 0. 
Using (9) – (11), eqs. (6) – (8) can be written in a more compact form as
                 EU
vdU
v = – X
vdP                  (12) 
              
                 EU
πdU
π  = – dR
π – X
πdP             (13)
                
                 EU
τdU
τ  = – dR
τ – X
τdP             (14)
showing  that  utility  from  consumption  in  the  host  country  depends  for  each  household  on   
its volume of implicit trade and the terms of trade, while that of the immigrants also depends on 
the flow of remittances sent to the source country.  












τdτ = QPP dP + QPkk
πdπ 
+ QPLdπ + QPLdτ.  This can simply be written as






τ = – X
πdπ – X
τdτ           (15)
where Σ ≡ vEPP
v + πEPP
π + τEPP
τ – QPP < 0 measures the responsiveness of the compensated excess 
demand for N to an increase in P.  Eqs. (12) – (15) are four equations that enable us to solve for   
the  changes  in  P  and  the  welfare  levels  of  the  three  types  of  households  as  functions  of   
the exogenous variables of the model.  These include the numbers of temporary and permanent 
immigrants and the amounts of remittances they each send to the source country.
3. Effects of temporary and permanent immigration
We first solve the system of eqs. (12) – (15) for the effects of an increase in the number of temporary 
immigrants (dτ  >  0) on the relative price of non-traded goods and the levels of welfare of the three 
different types of households.8  We have
      Under our assumptions, when compared with permanent immigrants, temporary foreign workers earn less income 
(because they have no capital), spend a smaller fraction of their earnings in the host country (because they send more 
remittances to the source country) and allocate a smaller fraction of their expenditure on N (because the relative price 
of N is lower in the source country).
8    Set dRπ = 0 and dR
τ = 0 in (13) – (14) and then substitute the solutions for changes in utilities of the three types of 
households from (12) – (14) into (15).  This gives the solution for dP/dτ in (16).  Use this solution back in (12) – (14) 
to obtain (17) – (19).On the welfare implications of temporary ... 55
            dP/dτ = – X
τ/S < 0             (16)




τ/S > 0             (17)




τ/S >  < 0                 (18)




τ/S < 0             (19)






τ is the slope of the uncompensated excess demand schedule for 
good N, and ci = EPU
i/EU
i > 0 is the marginal propensity of type i households (i = v, π, τ) to spend 
income on non-traded goods. Assuming Walrasian stability, S < 0. 
 
Thus the arrival of an additional temporary immigrant has a negative impact on the relative 
price of non-traded goods.  This is because, through their participation in the factor and commodity 
markets, temporary immigrants are implicitly net sellers of non-traded goods (i.e., X
τ < 0).  One 
more temporary migrant therefore creates an excess supply of such goods, causing P to decline.   
By  the  Stolper-Samuelson  theorem,  this  implies  that  temporary  immigration  lowers  the  wage   
and increases the rental on capital in the host country. 
The decrease in P represents an improvement in the terms of trade of native households who 
are, as explained earlier, net buyers of N (i.e., X
v > 0).  What equation (17) shows, in addition, is 
that the net gain for the natives, measured in terms of the numeraire, is the product of their net 
purchases of N, X
v, and the improvement in their terms of trade.  The latter depends, as shown 
in (16), on the amount, –X
τ, that each temporary immigrant contributes to the excess supply of N   
and the responsiveness of P to a change in the excess supply of N, as represented by 1/S.
 The effect on the level of welfare enjoyed by the permanent immigrants is shown in (18).  They 
experience an improvement in welfare, provided they are functionally “similar” to the natives 
(i.e., X
π > 0).   That improvement, however, is necessarily smaller than that enjoyed by the natives.   
This is because under the assumptions outlined above, the volume of net purchases of N by the 
natives is necessarily larger than that of the permanent immigrants (i.e., X
π < X
v).  It follows that   
the income gain of natives associated with the positive terms of trade effect is correspondingly 
greater.  Alternatively, if permanent immigrants are functionally “similar” to temporary immigrants,   
X
π < 0 and they experience a deterioration in their terms of trade and welfare. 
Finally,  we  observe  in  (19)  that  temporary  immigrants  suffer  a  loss  of  welfare  with   
the arrival of an additional temporary immigrant. This is because a newly arrived temporary 
immigrant  is  functionally  competing  with  the  existing  stock  of  temporary  immigrants.   
By entering the host country as an implicit net seller of N, he/she causes the terms of trade 
of other members of group τ to deteriorate.  This terms-of-trade deterioration and the drop in 
welfare is the larger the greater the volume of implicit trade conducted by a typical member 
of group τ.  As may be seen in (11), that volume, in turn, is inversely related to the temporary 
immigrant’s consumption of good N.9 
 The implications of an increase in the number of permanent immigrants can also be obtained 




9      In a more explicit analysis of a temporary immigrant’s consumption behavior, it can be shown that the absolute value 
of Xτ is an increasing function of remittances R
τ and a decreasing function of the degree of concavity of the migrant’s 
utility function.  See Djajić (1989).S. Djajić 56
           dP/dπ = – X
π/S >  < 0             (20)




π/S >  < 0                  (21)




π/S < 0             (22)




π/S >  < 0                  (23)
The  effect  on  P  and  therefore  on  factor  rewards  is  found  to  be  ambiguous.  The  key 
question here is whether permanent immigrants are functionally similar to the natives (X
π > 0)   
or to the temporary immigrants (X
π > 0).  In the former case, the arrival of an additional permanent 
immigrant  creates  an  excess  demand  for  N  and  causes  P  to  increase,  while  in  the  latter  case   
it contributes to an excess supply of N, driving P to a lower level. The implications for the level 
of welfare of the natives in eq. (21) hinges on the direction of the change in P. Thus if permanent 
immigrants  are  functionally  similar  to  the  natives,  the  latter  suffer  a  terms-of-trade  decline   
and a welfare loss, while temporary immigrants residing in the host country enjoy an improvement 
in  welfare  in  eq.  (23).  Alternatively,  if  permanent  immigrants  are  functionally  similar  to   
the temporary immigrants, the natives enjoy an improvement in welfare and temporary immigrants 
a  deterioration.  In  both  cases,  however,  arrival  of  a  permanent  immigrant  lowers  the  welfare   
of other permanent immigrants, as shown in (22). The logic is the same as in our discussion   
of equation (19). A new permanent immigrant competes for implicit trading opportunities with 
other agents who are functionally similar, making the latter worse off.
It is also interesting to compare equations (17) and (21) and see the impact on the welfare   
of natives associated with hosting a temporary instead of a permanent immigrant.10  We subtract 
the change in welfare of natives due to an increase in the number of permanent immigrants from 
that associated with an increase in the number of temporary immigrants.











π)/S           (24)
where we recall that EP
τ represents the demand for N by a temporary immigrant while EP
π is   
the demand for N by a permanent immigrant.  As we noted earlier, EP
τ < EP
π.  If, in addition, we take 
into account the fact that the capital brought by permanent immigrants into the host country has   
a negative Rybczynski effect, QPKk
π, on the output of N, it is unambiguous that hosting a temporary 
instead  of  a  permanent  immigrant  creates  an  excess  supply  of  N,  lowers  P,  and  improves  the 
welfare of the native population. The lower P reflects a decline in the wage rate and an increase   
in the rental rate on capital.  The drop in the wage and the increase in the welfare of natives implies 
that temporary immigration is a more efficient way of meeting shortages in the labour market   
of the host country if the objective is to limit the number of immigrants and maximize the welfare 
of the native population.
10      Similar type of analysis would apply if one is interested in the consequences of a temporary immigrant becoming 
a permanent immigrant, assuming that such transition also implies bringing capital from the source country and 
altering consumption and remitting behavior.  Only the sign of eq. (24), below, would change.On the welfare implications of temporary ... 57
4. Remittances and welfare
We consider next the welfare implications of remittance transfers. In the context of the present 
model, contrary to popular belief, an increase in remittances sent to the source country, by either 
temporary or permanent immigrants, has a positive effect on the welfare of natives.  The reason is 
that the more the migrants cut their spending in the host country in order to send money abroad, 
the lower is their demand for N and hence the lower the value of P. As a decline in P represents 
an improvement in the terms of trade for net buyers of N, an increase in remittance flows from the 
host to the source country generates an improvement in the welfare of natives. Solving the system 
(12) – (15), we have  
         EU
vdU
v/dR
τ = – X
vτc
τ/S > 0             (25)
         EU
vdU
v/dRπ = – X
vπcπ/S > 0             (26)
In  (25)  a  one  unit  increase  in  remittances  of  temporary  immigrants  reduces  their  group’s 
consumption of N by τcτ units.  This causes the price of N to fall by τcτ/S and the welfare of natives 
to increase by the product of their net purchases of N, X
v, and the improvement in their terms of 
trade.  For a one unit increase in the remittances of permanent immigrants, the improvement in 
the welfare of natives is similarly shown in (26). A comparison of the two expressions demonstrates 
two  key  elements:    First,  the  improvement  in  the  welfare  of  natives  is  larger,  the  greater  the 
remittance sender’s marginal propensity to consume N. As argued in the Introduction, there is 
strong presumption that the cτ < cπ.  On that count alone, the natives are better off when permanent 
rather than temporary immigrants increase their remittance transfers by one unit. Second, the 
impact on the welfare of natives depends also on the number of immigrants of each type present 
in the economy. The larger the number, the greater the improvement in the terms of trade of the 
natives when each of them sends an extra dollar back home.
5. Discussion of the results and extensions
In the context of our model, the above analysis unambiguously shows that the natives are better off 
by hosting temporary rather than permanent immigrants. Welfare of the natives hinges on being 
able to interact (i.e., implicitly trade) within the economy with agents who are functionally different.   
That is, have different factor endowments and expenditure patterns when compared with the natives.     
In this respect, it is temporary rather than permanent immigrants who are functionally more different.   
The arrival of a temporary immigrant therefore contributes more to the welfare of natives than does 
the  arrival  of  a  permanent  immigrant.  In  fact  new  arrivals  of  permanent  immigrants  can  even 
reduce the welfare of the native population. This is the case when the two groups are functionally 
similar to each other.  Functional similarity of natives and permanent immigrants is more likely:   
a) the larger the number of temporary relative to permanent immigrants in the host country, b) the 
smaller the flow of remittances sent by a typical permanent immigrant, c) the larger the flow of 
remittances sent by a typical temporary immigrant, and d) the smaller the difference between the natives   
and permanent immigrants in terms of their ownership of capital in the host country. S. Djajić 58
 Remittance flows sent by immigrants from the host country back to the source country are 
found to increase the welfare of natives.  Interestingly, this positive impact on welfare is greater   
if  the  remittance  sender  has  a  larger  marginal  propensity  to  consume  non-traded  goods.  In 
comparing temporary and permanent immigrants, it is the latter who presumably have a larger 
propensity to consume non-traded goods so that a dollar remitted by a permanent immigrant has a 
greater positive effect on the welfare of natives than a dollar remitted by a temporary immigrant.
 One of the shortcomings of the present model is that it captures only some of the key elements 
that need to be examined when comparing temporary and permanent migration options from   
the perspective of the host country.  In the real world there are business cycles, unemployment,   
the welfare state, congestion effects and other externalities that need to be taken into consideration.   
When there is unemployment, migrants that bring capital may in fact generate a stronger positive 
effect on the welfare of natives than those who come with just labour.  The outflow of remittances 
can then also have an effect on welfare of natives that is quite different from the one described   
in Section 4.  In such a world, however, a shortage in the market for labour is not the most pressing 
problem.  The full-employment structure employed in the analysis above is, in my view, more 
appropriate when addressing the question of how to meet a shortage in the labour market while 
maximizing the welfare of natives.  
 One possible extension of the model would be to allow for saving and capital accumulation, 
as  well  as  population  growth.  A  distinction  between  temporary  and  permanent  immigrants   
that should not be neglected in that setting is that the latter are more likely to invest in physical 
(and human) capital located in (and specific to) the host country, while temporary migrants tend   
to make their investments back home. A richer framework of analysis, distinguishing different 
types  of  natives,  would  also  be  an  interesting  extension  of  the  present  model.  It  would  then 
be possible to show that some natives are better off if the country admits permanent migrants 
than they are if it relies, instead, on temporary immigrants.  In fact when natives differ among 
themselves, either of the two types of immigration can possibly be harmful to a specific subset   
of native households.  In general, a group of natives suffers a decline in welfare whenever the host 
country experiences an inflow of immigrants who are functionally “similar” to them. Another 
possible extension of the model would consist of distinguishing between different skill categories 
of labour.  In this case, as well, the functional similarity of natives and immigrants holds the key 
to determining whether a particular group benefits or is harmed by immigration.  An empirical test 
of the model developed in this paper or some of its extensions constitutes another important item 
on the agenda for future research.On the welfare implications of temporary ... 59
References
Bauer T.K., Sinning M. (2005), The Savings Behavior of Temporary and Permanent Migrants in Germany,   
  RWI Discussion Paper, 29, RWI, Essen.
Dixit A., Norman V. (1984), Theory of International Trade, Cambridge University Press, London.
Djajić S. (1986), International Migration, Remittances and Welfare in a Dependent Economy, Journal   
  of Development Economics, 21, 229–234.
Djajić S. (1989), Migrants in a Guest-Worker System:  A Utility Maximizing Approach, Journal   
  of Development Economics, 31, 32–339.
Djajić S. (1998), Emigration and Welfare in an Economy with Foreign Capital, Journal of Development   
  Economics, 56, 433–445.
Docquier F., Rapoport H. (2006), The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances, in: J. Mercier-Ythier, S.C.   
  Kolm (eds), Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, Elsevier (North   
  Holland), Amsterdam.
Dustmann C., Mestres J. (2009), Remittances and Temporary Migration, Journal of Development   
  Economics, forthcoming.
Ghosh B. (2006), Migrants’ Remittances and Development: Myths, Rhetoric and Realities,  IOM,   
  Geneva.
Glytsos  N.  (1997),  Remitting  Behavior  of    “Temporary”  and  “Permanent”  Migrants:  The  Case   
  of Greeks in Germany and Australia, Labour, 11, 409–435.
Kirdar M. (2009), Source Country Characteristics and Immigrants’ Migration Duration and Savings 
  Decisions, MPRA Paper, 13322, University of Munich.
Lucas R.E.B. (2005), International Migration and Economic Development: Lessons from Low‑Income 
  Countries, Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA.
NILC  (2007),  10  Reasons  to  Keep  Family‑Based  Visas  Separate  from  a  Point  System,   
  http://www.nilc.org/DC_Conf/dc-conf2007/wrkshp_materials/2-6_10pointsonfamily.pdf. 
Pinger P.R. (2007), Come Back or Stay?  Spend Here or There?, Working Paper, 438, Institute for the   
  World Economy, Kiel.
Quibria M.G. (1996), International migration, remittances and income distribution in the source   
  country, Bulletin of Economic Research, 48.
Rivera-Batiz  F.  (1982),  International  migration,  non-traded  goods  and  economic  welfare  in  the   
  source country, Journal of Development Economics, 11, 81–90.
Rubenstein  E.S.  (2004),  Remittances  Are  Good  for  Them  and  Us…  Up  To  A  Point,   
  http://www.vdare.com/rubenstein/remittance.htm.
Sinning M. (2007), Determinants of Savings Remittances, RWI Discussion Paper, 23, RWI, Essen.
Stark O. (1991), The Migration of Labor, Blackwell, Oxford.
Stark O., R.E.B. Lucas (1988), Migration, Remittances and the Family, Economic Development and   
  Cultural Change, 36 (3), 465–481.
Unheim P. (2007), New Data Sheds Light on Sending Patterns of Immigrants in Canada, Focal Point:   
  Canada’s Spotlight on the Americas, 6, 3–4. 